Harvard Business Review: Carter Racing Case Essay

This is a re altogethery tough closing and the pass is constantly changing against to the conclusion. But after a thorough consideration, I dont think the team should ladder this time. whoremonger should exit more data and training for the engine sorrow until he make up ones minds to induce again for the side by side(p) season. There are numerous paths to decide to race or not for magic trick Carter when it comes to decision making. He keep make the decision based on either his fellow drumhead mechanic turkey cocks view, or the engine expert capital of Minnesotas assumption. However, regardless either way, the conclusion should be reached by or so sort of quantitative analysis.At the first glance at the scenario, the present(prenominal) reaction was to throw all the numbers provided into the opportunity live calculation, and discriminate the pros and cons between the options. However, in order to come up with the most exact prediction on the expected value of the o utcome, it is prerequisite to gather the all of the associated costs in dollars. John can easily calculate the cost to withdraw by adding up the fees from the data that was provided in the slipperiness. Yet, for the other options race and win, race and fail, it is impossible for us to calculate the precise cost of kind and failure since thither are no price tags for fames and sponsorship possibilities if the team wins the race, as puff up as the risks that might happen in relation of gasket failure such as life, and destructing in team reputation. Thus, without the inclusion of all the necessary factors, the result of calculated the expected value would be useless in measuring losses and gains.The second reason that I think John should wait for the race is due to insufficient information provided in the case. In addition to the map that was provided by Tom (exhibit 1), there should also be a chart showing the distribution on head gasket conquest is related to temperature since the race might begin in a twenty-four hour period with fairly low temperature. Thus, if I were John, I would guide to determine to discin one casert the race until further information is gathered.Of course it is not easy to coax someone on things that no one can be ensure of. Thoughts and doubts gone through the mind such as the raceitself is in the nature of a risky business wondering if John should collar the opportunity right now before it flies away because next season is nonetheless unknown, etc Even after knowing insufficient information was available, it is still really tempting to choose racing rather than withdraw. This emphasis fighting unconsciously in the mind reminds me of the principle of scarcity , which raft tend to value electromotive force loss (the fees for racing) more heavily than potential gains (engine invested and human life). These face often caused get offrs to have bias on decision making.Besides the method of quantitative calculation on costs , the problem John faces also consists of the selection between two different sides of recommendations one from his promontory mechanic Tom who suggests for race, and the other engine mechanic capital of Minnesota who opposes the race. The design and data presented by these two mechanics act as a persuasion to John. Whereas, Tom and Paul both have extensive start out in racing, yet Paul lacked the sophisticated engineering training as mentioned in part B of the reading raised an interesting plight on whether John should shift more of his selection power towards Tom based on the insufficiency of Pauls training.To tie this case to Mulveys article, the purpose of a team is increase the strength of the system of rules by forming and adding up the different perspectives together. For organization leaders, John, in this case, it is actually authoritative for him to balance the team dynamics to make sure each souls voice is equally weighed in team function trance such balance is ve ry easy to lose grip once one side of the opinion is valued too heavily. This situation is well demonstrated between John, Paul, and Tom. At the beginning of the case , Paul showed his office staff as a strong opponent against the team to race.But as the case evolves, Pauls attitude changed as Tom showed the chart in exhibit 1, and agreed to race at the end. It seems that Paul has accustomed up his beliefs and agreed with the team on racing by pass judgment the data provided by Tom of who that has a higher rank than Paul even though the data seem to be insufficient to transport Pauls position from racing. This matches Mulveys views of the presence of someone with expertness and compelling argument since Tom is the chief of mechanic, which might have light-emitting diode an assumption to indicate higher level inqualification. With such precedency assumption and numerous useless discussions on with John on the gasket problem, it is very equivalently for Paul to accept Toms data as long as it makes some sense in explaining the gasket problem.In addition, there is also a subtle sense that Paul may have felt the pressure from the team to cause him to conform. It is clear that the team leader, John, is feeling frustrated about the race sponsorship and eagerly wishing to get both of the mechanics approval to race. Being the only person that disagrees, Paul little by little lessened his voice. This illustrates the points of pressure from others to conform and dysfunctional decision making clime that Mulvey has brought up.In sum, as if I were John, it is essential for team leaders to manage the team with a great sensibility of each team pieces personality and expertise in order to maintain the conjunction spirit. A well balanced team would allow people like Paul to speak up his mind and not compromise his views, and still utilize Toms expertise. A well-functional team is the only way to have a possible appropriate decision making solution. defecate citedMulve y, Paul. When teammates raise a white flag. Academy of Management Executive. 1996 pp. 43